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Pan African Studies Department
This article focuses on the welfare work of industrialists which was
developed as a mechanism for fighting trade unionism during the Pro-
gressive era. This focus is designed to place welfare in its proper per-
spective within the political economy and to identify its political and
economic functions. The article concludes that industrial welfare was
one of the instruments used in creating a work ethic in the United
States and one of the mechanisms of social engineering both in and
outside of industry.
The inability to develop a rational social welfare policy in
the United States and the confused public perception of welfare
is a result of deliberate distortion of market realities. Welfare is
seen as an isolated government action; as something done by
government for a few nonworkers who can't help themselves.
The key description is nonworker. Somehow a dichotomy has
been forged between those who work and those who receive
welfare. The legacy of welfare is in fact quite different. It indi-
cates to us that welfare measures are an outgrowth of the work
environment. In fact welfare was designed to aid in controlling
the work process. The separation of work and welfare serves a
very useful ideological function by completely obscuring the ac-
tual function of social welfare. Welfare must be understood as
part of the political economy of this country. According to Piven
and Cloward, in their major work on welfare, Regulating the
Poor:
Relief arrangements are ancillary to economic arrangements. Their
chief function is to regulate labor, and they do that in two general
ways. First, when mass unemployment leads to outbreaks of tur-
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moil, relief programs are ordinarily initiated or exapanded to ab-
sorb and control enough of the unemployed to restore order; then,
as turbulence subsides, the relief system contracts, expelling those
who are needed to populate the labor market. (1971, p. 3)
The expansion and contraction of public welfare must be seen
as a political phenomenon, one which helps to regulate labor.
This regulation comes not only in terms of the number of people
in the workforce but also their attitudes and behavior. Indeed
the very initiation of welfare measures can only be understood
within the context of work culture in the U.S. Much like today,
early welfare measures were used to reward or threaten workers.
This article looks at one of the early examples of social wel-
fare, industrial welfare. The objective is to identify this form of
welfare as one of the regulatory tools used by industrialists to
control labor. Industrial welfare was seen as necessary during
the Progressive era to help prevent the spread of trade unionism.
More important for contemporary reflection is the way in which
industrialists passed on the responsiblity and expense of these
"welfare" services to government, thereby formalizing the sep-
aration of work and welfare. Government still bears the brunt
of responsibility for the casualties of labor (unemployment, dis-
ability etc.) while the source of the problem, industry, remains
hidden from view and absolved of responsibility. The historical
record which points out the transferal of welfare services from
industry to government helps us to understand how the sepa-
ration of work and welfare has been shaped in the consciousness
of the average American.
Industrial Welfare and the Process of Reproduction
The cultural styles and habits of workers posed the most
serious threat to industry at the turn of the century. While in-
dustrialists could not hope to shatter or dissolve these traditions
overnight, they did have to address seriously the whole range
of culture, continually trying to adapt the old to their own pur-
poses or attempting to produce new patterns. The disruptive
effect of culture on the industrialization process sparked an ur-
gency among industrialists to insure loyalty and order within
their enterprises. The crude, casual, and personal ways of treat-
ing employees in the plant were therefore coupled with the om-
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nipotence of the foreman. But while such informality in factory
life may have had its advantages for workers and owners alike,
decisions were still arbitrary and the tug of war between work-
ers and management over control of the work process resulted
in anarchy as Gerb Korman illustrates in this passage:
For many years most Milwaukee firms kept only meager employ-
ment records. This was true even of the E. P. Allis Company which
by the mid-1880's was already employing hundreds of workers.
Foremen and timekeepers simply noted the number of hours
worked, rates of wages, and prices for piecework, often keeping
no formal records at all. Indeed, the company made no effort to
pay by check during its early years preferring to refer to its Polish
workers as 'Mike 1,' 'Mike 2,' or 'Mike 3.' This seemed much eas-
ier than trying to master Polish names.
... According to J.M.J. Keogh of E. P. Allis: 'When I was time-
keeper (in the 1880's) the workmen were given no work tickets.
They obtained the number of the casting or forging verbally from
the foreman and gave their job to the timekeeper who posted it on
a sheet which covered the entire labor cost on the order. . . . There
were no time clocks and no production boards to assist the foremen
in knowing the next job to give the workers. The result being that
the foreman would let his men run out of work and then would
have to call at the foreman's desk or trail him around the shop to
see what the next job would be.' Highly skilled pieceworkers hag-
gled with foremen over prices for particular jobs, partly in their
own interests, but also because foremen, not the company, paid
the helpers. (1967, p. 64)
Order, prior to the turn of the century, was impossible in
industry unless employers allowed ethnic connections to govern
employment practices. They could not ignore human relations
even if they wanted to. The result was the unsystematic involve-
ment of companies in the personal lives of workers. For example,
land and money were donated to churches by industrialists but
this was done in an effort to curb alcohol consumption. Thus
church deeds stipulated and/or prohibited the sale of liquor on
the properties. Banquets, company outings, and other celebra-
tions were held. Some employers contributed to workers' be-
nevolent aid societies which helped to pay medical and funeral
expenses for injured or killed employees, while other employers
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handled such issues on an idividual basis. Stuart Brandes in his
study of these so-called "welfare" practices of employers de-
scribes how they were designed to give industrialists a foothold
into cultural habits of the employees.
Some companies made it possible for employees to keep cows or
chickens, and one maintained a company bird sanctuary. Com-
pany gardens were very popular with many employers, and floral
displays (perhaps picked from a company greenhouse) graced many
factories and houses, recalling misty memories of an agricultural
past. Urban living required more attention to grooming than had
farm life, and company manicurists cleaned fingernails while com-
pany shoe polishers blackened boots. In case employees ran afoul
of the many regulations established by community living, free le-
gal advice was sometimes available.
... Since one of the most important social problems was the ac-
culturation of young persons to the industrial society, by 1900 var-
ious American firms operated every form of school short of a college
or university....
• . . Even the most basic problems of food and shelter often aroused
the attention of American executives. Many employees dined at
company restaurants. Company stores proliferated, and many
companies provided milk for their employees from a company
dairy ... (1976, p. 4)
Philanthropic though these activities may seem, the employers
through such actions were able for a while to avoid formal re-
sponsibilities towards their workers, such as workmen's com-
pensation and other employee benefits. Later, many of these
functions would be conveniently turned over to local government.
Despite industry's social policies, or maybe because of them
the independent political action of workers continued, both or-
ganized and unorganized. We can only guess at the number of
factories which dosed because of workers social obstinancy.
However, between 1880 and 1900 nearly 23,000 strikes affected
more than 117,000 business establishments in the United States,
an average of three new strikes a day for 20 years (Brandes,
1976). These actions often brought state, federal, and local gov-
ernment into the picture as either mediator or supplier of troops
for repression. However, the employer had to find new and/or
improved ways of control for stability. The casual, unsystematic
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managerial response to decision-making and control was
doomed; a more rational means of organization was necessary.
Writers don't agree entirely on the content of the new "ra-
tionalization" method. Some, like Korman, combine welfare
programs, scientific management, industrial betterment, and
social engineering and see in them the concerted thrust to bring
order to production. Other writers like Daniel Nelson see wel-
fare work and the scientific management of Taylor as differing
and competing managerial philosophies. But, if we look at the
intentions and motivations which all of these new managerial
techniques and philosophies professed and the definitions given
them, we see that Taylorism and welfare work had common
goals and a parallel course of development. The definitions re-
produced by Nelson are instructive:
Taylorism was an outgrowth of the 'works management' movement
and the pioneering work of Frederick W. Taylor at the Midvale and
Bethlehem Steel Companies in the 1880s and 1890s. Its basic prem-
ise was that 'human activity could be measured, analyzed, and
controlled by techniques analogous to those that had proved suc-
cessful when applied to physical objects.' In practical terms it com-
bined a variety of new and old ideas, the most notable of which
were time study and the incentive wage .... [But] Taylor's system
demanded a thorough reorganization of the shop, new roles for
managers and workers alike and most ominously, a 'mental rev-
olution.' (1972, p. 1)
Alongside "Taylorism" stood industrial welfare work. Be-
cause of its political function it has a much less precise definition
than Taylorism, although it seemed to be embraced more widely
by industry. The National Civic Federation, an organization of
America's biggest businessmen, was the strongest supporter of
industrial welfare. They wrote:
... welfare work involves special consideration for physical com-
fort wherever labor is performed; opportunities for recreation; ed-
ucational advantages; and the providing of suitable sanitary
homes . .. plans for saving and lending money and provisions or
insurance and pensions. (NCF, 1904)
All of the examples of industrial welfare owe their origins to a
common source in the National Civic Federation. Business and
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industry asserted their new organizational fervor and class con-
sciousness in establishing the NCF in 1900, where they under-
took collectively the task of exercising control of public opinion.
Smaller and middle range businessmen, manufacturers and
merchants, who were tied exclusively to the domestic market
and who were therefore more vulnerable to labor and financial
fluctuation, maintained very parochial and narrow interests. They
acted as individual entities and not as part of an ownership
"class" in their opposition to unions, their avoidance of national
interests, and their opposition to the big corporations. The NCF
too opposed unions, radicals, and Socialists, but they consid-
ered the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), domi-
nated by small business, the "anarchists" among businessmen,
to which they were opposed (Weinstein, 1968).
Even though the NCF was an exclusive business club with
the responsibility of "educating businessmen to the changing
nature of America's business system," they nevertheless main-
tained a "tripartite" membership with "labor" and "the public"
as well. We therefore find among its members names such as
Grover Cleveland, William Taft, Samuel Gomphers, and John
Mitchell along side the long list of industrialists and financiers
such as Belmont, Hanna, Carnegie, and Morgan. The NCF set
the tone of the age and professed an ideology which denied class
interest, substituting in its place "conciliation" and "reform"
based on "cooperation." Ironically, it was the class interest and
consciousness of the industrialists that allowed them to take on
functions of "public officials." They realized all too well the lim-
itations of individual company action in attempting to establish
control. Therefore businessmen actively reshaped their own im-
age and that of the corporations to win the loyalty of workers.
This included the assumption of many social responsibilities
which today we associate with government.
In the early history of NCF, 1900 to 1905, its main function
was that of mediating labor disputes. It was therefore the fore-
runner of the government's Commission on Industrial Relations
(1913-1915). While NCF rejected trade unionism as an indepen-
dent movement, it willingly developed a Trade Agreements De-
partment under the joint chairmanship of Francis Robbins of
the Pittsburg Coal Company and John Mitchell of the United
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Mine Workers, to establish some mechanism of agreement be-
tween members of the organizations. Trade unions were viewed
as a "bulkwark" against the great wave of socialism. Where trade
unionism did not stabilize factory relations or where they were
rejected by owners, the NCF suggested welfare measures.
Any uniformity in welfare measures owed a debt to the gen-
eral policy of the NCF which its member industries followed.
The Welfare Department of the NCF was established in 1904.
The general approach of the Department was to promote "sym-
pathy and a sense of identification between the employer and
his employees" by integrating the lives and leisure time of work-
ers with the functioning of the corporation (Weinstein, 1968).
However, as James Weinstein dearly explains, part of the process
of integrating the lives of the workers with that of the corpora-
tion involved the assumption by corporations of many functions
which today we see as government's responsibility. Early welfare
concerns included, technical education for workers, kindergar-
ten for their children, low cost housing, recreation facilities,
some aspects of public health programs, saving and lending
money, insurance and pensions. Such paternalistic labor rela-
tions it was felt would undermine union strength, though this
was not always the result. But the NCF was somewhat successful
in individualizing workers' political action and they maintained
their own class-based hegemony. Industry must be credited with
providing the initial impetus for the use of social services in the
structuring of political relations. If industry relinquished much
of its "social responsibility," it was because it was able to pass
on the responsibility to government while retaining the benefits.
Additionally, the conditions which created the need for certain
types of welfare also facilitated their demise. In industry, med-
ical plans, pension plans, factory environment and employee
representation replaced the old emphasis on education, recre-
ation, and religion for workers.
While welfare work was not pervasive throughout industry,
it allowed the industrialists to address pragmatic concerns in the
garb of philanthropy and paternalism. Like Taylorism it was a
response to the specific pressures of labor turmoil. While Taylor
very openly announced the very ambitious promises of scientific
management-greater output, lower costs, higher wages and la-
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
bor-management harmony-welfare work programs camou-
flaged similar intentions of reduced production costs and
increased profits. However, some employers were quite proud
to announce of welfare work that: ". . . [it] decreases the floating
element and secures a stable work force, promotes harmonious
relations and worker loyalty, combats unionism and insures
against strikes" (Cardullo, 1915, p. 197).
In the final analysis the employer would choose those tech-
niques which were least expensive economically and emotion-
ally. Often welfare work was less demanding of owners and
managers because, unlike Taylorism, it allowed them to retain
their traditional paternalistic roles and defend themselves against
trade unions under the guise of "social responsibility." Welfare
work helped to transform the corporation itself from solely an
economic institution into the basic social unity of American so-
ciety (Scheinberg, 1966). Some historians have recognized the
intent of these reform measures and have placed them in their
proper perspective within the whole web of bureaucratization
which was occurring in the United States at the turn of the cen-
tury. It is important, therefore, that we see scientific manage-
ment and welfare work as opposite sides of the same coin. They
were not simply the result of diligent engineers like Taylor and
social workers like Gertrude Beeks of International Harvester.
The pressures of workers' uncontrolled habits brought about the
necessary emergence of what Brandes calls a tripartite system
involving labor, government, and big business (Brandes, 1976).
Mark Hanna, industrialist and President of the National Civic
Federation, became adviser to President McKinley, which gave
national recognition to welfare work. John Commons, in his
efforts to study ways to involve government in employment con-
ditions, brought notoriety to scientific management in 1910 in
the Easter Rate Case, and in 1909 the federal government utilized
features of Taylorism at the Watertown arsenal. Thus welfare
measures and scientific management became means for en-
trenchment of business hegemony and fulfillment of the cor-
porate state. Both were means of "indoctrinating workers into
accepting corporations as the central institutions of modem
American life. Part of the process of integrating the lives of
workers with that of the corporation involved the assumption
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by corporations of many functions now seen as government re-
sponsibilities" (Brandes, 1976, p. 8).
Ironically, because welfare work was based on sentiment
rather than "science," its rationale always served to underscore
the dehumanizing consequences of industrial work which in-
dustrialists were attempting to deny. Hence, welfare begins by
calling attention to precisely that which industrialists proposed
to obscure.
Industrial Welfare and Skilled Workers
In industries which attempted to institute scientific man-
agement and industrial welfare, the reactions of employees serve
to explain further some of their differences. The old forms of
management were not only predicated on paternalism which
revolved around the whim and good graces of owners and fo-
remen, but also on the loyalty and efficiency of workers, partic-
ularly skilled workers. These workers became the primary targets
of industrial welfare schemes. They asserted a great deal of au-
tonomy over work procedures. However, once industries began
to expand and to consolidate, this dependence on skilled labor
became intolerable because it threatened the control of owners.
Skill eventually fell victim to systematization through the mech-
anism of scientific management (e.g., the introduction of the
assembly line, a new division of labor, new tools, new work
methods, etc.).
In many cases where scientific management was incorpo-
rated in a plant, welfare work might also be adopted. Employers
sought to retain some of the personalism of old managerial sys-
tems in an effort to maintain workers' loyalty and welfare
schemes allowed this. Theie measures would be instituted as
often inside the factory as outside. Inside, employers, like Pull-
man in Illinois, might construct modem ventilation systems,
lunchrooms, and restrooms, and hire company doctors for
workers, while their industrial welfare measures outside the
workplace most often consisted of libraries, restaurants, dub
houses, recreational facilities, dancing classes, schools, housing
projects, company bands, Sunday school, and cooking lessons.
Modem systematic welfare programs of the period institution-
alized these practices not only by coordinating them nationally
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and regionally, as the NCF attempted to do, but these measures
were professionalized under the direction of experts hired by
the companies and operating out of newly established industry
departments. The professionalization of industrial sociology, in-
dustrial psychology as well as social work begin in these
departments.
When industries provided savings and loan associations,
accident insurance plans, and pensions for the elderly, they were
normally directed to skilled workers. While the reorganization
of industry facilitated by scientific management may have an-
tagonized skilled workers by upgrading the "unskilled" and
transferring skilled knowledge to management, welfare mea-
sures served as a reward system (carrot and the stick); a way of
encouraging worker retention and a way to salvage worker loy-
alty. Industry was constantly fearful that antagonizing workers
might force them into the arms of organized labor. Welfare mea-
sures were designed to prevent this while at the same time cre-
ating a new dependence among workers. David Brody identifies
this in his study of steelworkers: "Through promotions, hous-
ing, bonuses, pensions, and steady work, corps of company
retainers were developed. The skilled workmen entered an orbit
of dependence, induced to accept without dispute the terms of
employment set by the steel companies" (Brody, 1960, p. 90).
I don't mean to imply that employers were too generous with
their welfare measures. Workers paid for industrial welfare as
citizens pay for government welfare. For accident insurance,
workmen contributed a specified amount deducted from their
wages and employers never contributed more than a third of the
total costs (Brody, 1960). Additionally, employers were able to
escape the legal responsibility for industrial accidents through
the use of "common law" defenses: the fellow servant doctrine,
the assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. When
worker demands for compensation intensified in such a way that
industries could no longer avoid their legal responsibility they
called on government for support. Either the government would
provide for workers' coverage or regulate the limits of coverage
through the courts. By 1912, after several years of investigation,
a Congressional Commission finally established a compromise
between labor and capital. Weinstein, in his excellent analysis
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of the transfer of these social functions to government during
the Progressive era points out the supportive role of government
when the social welfare expenses of industry were overtaxed.
For example, in the case of accident insurance companies were
able to depend on government to set "limits" on compensation
while ensuring deregulation.
The competition between industrial welfare work and trade
unions for workers' loyalty is further indicated by the historical
presence of programs which rose and fell concurrently with
unionism. The spirit in welfare programs during the 1920s was
in part a response to the gains made by organized labor during
World War I. Welfare work created "mediating structures," which
in some instances came to fulfill some of the function of the
family as well (Brandes, 1976). Regardless of the reaction of
workers to these programs, government and industry imposed
themselves on the daily lives of individuals without request.
Eventually, government would come to dominate the area of
"welfare" services, particularly housing, health, and recreation
as their expense increased for industry.
It is not my intention to prove or imply that any particular
group of workers, women, immigrants, skilled or unskilled, was
more responsive to social welfare than another. To do so would
only duplicate previous errors in analysis which persist in as-
sociating this acceptance with the lack of political consciousness.
Welfarism has left its impact on all workers. Today those persons
outside of the industrial environment are the most obvious tar-
gets of welfarism, but it permeates all our lives, those who work
and those who do not. Ironically, at the turn of the century, the
only judgement which seems fair, given the contradictory evi-
dence, is that workers in the industrial sector were the primary
targets of welfare, while variations in program application were
influenced by geographic considerations.
According to Brandes, welfare work was also one of the tech-
niques used by government in its attempts to stimulate produc-
tion. However, industrial welfare waxed in times of prosperity
and waned in depression (Brandes, 1976), expanding when busi-
ness profits were up and industry anticipated worker demands
for greater compensation, welfarism was a way to head them off.
But this cycle was reversed for government (Piven & Cloward,
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1971) precisely because government was concerned with mobi-
lizing the economy and the task was more important in bad
times than good. Therefore, during World War I the Wilson
Administration formed
... government bodies to supervise critical goods and services as
food, fuel, railroads, shipping, and housing. Two of these, the
United States Shipping Board and the United States Housing Cor-
poration, encouraged welfarism in industrial housing. The Hous-
ing Corporation was created by the War Department to build homes
for workers. It included a town planning division, chaired by famed
city planner Fredrick Law Olmsted, which planned numerous
housing projects near arsenals, munitions factories, and shipyards.
Several developments qualified as full-scale model towns designed
to give pleasant accommodations at mass productions prices. The
Housing Corporation spent a total of $194 million to house about
six thousand families. In effect, the United States government con-
structed a whole series of "company" towns during World War I.
(Brandes, 1976, p. 4)
These developments show clearly government's assumption of
the responsibility of industrial welfarism and this would clearly
affect the cognitive referents or symbols given to the working
class.
Meanwhile, self-help institutions suffered attack and obli-
teration at the hands of the new social welfare functions of gov-
ernment. The family, home, neighborhood, community, places
of leisure, taverns, stores, meeting halls, churches, stoops, and
alleys, all of which had been shaped by occupational groupings
at an earlier period of capitalist development, lost their place
within the pattern of labor and leisure. The conditions of work,
long hours and poor wages, seriously affected patterns of rela-
tions among "unskilled immigrants" as well. While the urban
political Machine did lend some legitimacy to the urban ethnic
ghettos. Even with the demise of the "Machine," ethnic culture
and ritual still remain a source of strength for immigrants in
resisting the exploitation of work. However, as industry and
government introduced social services into communities, insti-
tutions arose which would undermine the functions of the "old"
cultural patterns. To prevent home from being, as some workers
commented, "just the place where I eat and sleep," (Alt, 1976)
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it had to be recreated as a social center. A cynic might argue that
the conditions of poverty and overcrowding therefore came to
serve as a positive function for the poor who were forced to live
together to survive. This description of workers housing from
a study of the Homestead mill community presents a picture of
cultural habits which give positive meaning to the otherwise
negative condition of poverty:
The Slavic workers, plus their families, relatives and intirant boar-
ders, lived together in large numbers and in very close quarters,
usually in tenement houses which would often face and share a
common courtyard. It is in the extended home that the primary
social bonds of mutuality are first reproduced as they originate out
of the conditions of exploitative industrial employment. The ex-
tended home and ecological character of the early tenements fos-
tered extensive social interaction among its members. For one, the
homes which occupied a common courtyard used a common water
source and shared one toilet facility. During mild weather, the
courtyard Was typically a focus for discussions between men on
shop-floor political and cultural topics, and was a place for playing
cards, singing, and dancing. The house itself was a major center
for social life: "In the evening a group often gathers around the
stove gossiping of home days, playing cards, drinking, and playing
simple musical instruments. On the Saturday after pay day the
household usually clubs together to buy a case of beer which it
drinks at home." The home was also the scene of larger festivities
during the events of birth, marriage, and death. These gatherings
always drew workmates, relatives, old friends, and new neighbors
together where "joy and grief and religious ceremony are alike
forgotten in a riotous good time." (Alt, 1976, p. 63)
However, deteriorating living conditions always demanded that
the poor plan on leaving rather than remaining in such quarters.
Therefore, either returning to Europe or geographic relocation
in the United States remained an objective. Transiency and geo-
graphic mobility became the greatest threat to working class
community life.
Scientific management and industrial welfare combined to
undermine the function of occupational communities as the most
significant peer group. The extended family, the local tavern,
and other working dass community centers lost their earlier
meaning. This is not to say that individualization completely
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replaced group activity among workers, but it is pointed out
here to make reference to social changes taking place for workers
and the new conceptions of life which may have emerged.
Contemporary studies of industrial welfare and its conse-
quences in working class communities, however, do argue that
individualism and consumerism came to completely dominate
working class life and leisure. Leisure, more and more, became
associated with a reaction against work thereby helping to so-
lidify the separation of work from social conscience.
Even though studies show workers maintained a low eval-
uation of welfare work (Houser, 1927), there is no question that
it left an impact. The Progressive era opened up a whole new
role for institutions in the social life of individuals. The as-
sumption that workers could not provide certain necessities nor
amenities for themselves and/or families, obviously had social
and psychological consequences. When workers accepted such
services, they implicitly exposed a weakness (Brandes, 1976).
Immigrants were fast coming to view themselves not as tem-
porary workers, but as permanent residents in the new indus-
trial order. If the attitude toward work had changed by 1921,
social engineering techniques were largely responsible. There
is no question that these techniques were aimed at the control
of labor. But the long term consequences for political conscious-
ness seem to have been more successful than the short term
control of behavior. Strikes did dedine somewhat at Taylorized
plants and those with welfare programs, but they did not dis-
appear. The promise of social harmony had not been achieved.
Therefore, industry would have to turn to both government and
the craft unions to aid its process of social control.
Even though organized labor came to oppose both industrial
welfarism and scientific management, it is improtant to note
that its leadership was actually a part of the National Civic Fed-
eration which brought "welfarism" and employee/employer co-
operation to national attention. John Mitchell and Samuel
Gomphers were both members of the NCF and both applauded
the initial creation of the NCFs Welfare Department. Therefore,
while industrialists had as their expressed intent the elimination
of unionism, union officials embraced their goals of "propagat-
ing an improved American working man: thrifty, dean, tem-
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perate, intelligent, and especially, industrious and loyal"
(Brandes, 1976, p. 33). Since most industrial welfare measures
seemed beneficial to skilled workers who constituted the mem-
bership of the unions at that time, the labor leaders can be seen
as participating in that which ultimately undermined their le-
gitimacy. The AFL not only activiely sought to cooperate with
owners and management on particular issues at the national level
but came, as Dubofsky describes, to "ape their corporate cous-
ins." The labor leaders reorganized their associations in the im-
age of Progressive reform "in which the rank and file obediently
followed the commands of bureaucratically indined well-paid
officials" (Dubofsky, 1975, p. 84). The organizational reforms of
the unions, like those in industry and government, transformed
both the nature and process of decision-making, authority, and
participation. They emphasized appointed rather than elected
to insure loyalty. Administrative techniques became more im-
portant than oratory and charisma. Like government, the union,
too, sought to take politics out of their "business." While shun-
ning scientific management, the unions adopted a prostandar-
dization posture in their defense of formal work rules and
procedures. They also emphasized their contractual relationship
with industry.
It was organized labor's antiimmigrant, antiunskilled poli-
cies and attitudes which would ultimately be their demise. Not
only did they exclude the unskilled from their locals, but im-
migrants were chided for their "alien and inferior character." As
for Black migrants to the industrial cities, the AFL exclaimed:
"Hordes of ignorant blacks, possessing but few of those attri-
butes we have learned to revere and love, huge strapping fel-
lows, ignorant and vicious, whose predominating trait was
animalism" (Dubofsky, 1975, p. 84). In an effort to defend their
own craft exclusiveness, the AFL even opposed government ef-
forts to mandate maximum hours and minimum wages for adult
men and provide unemployment insurance and social security.
With everything eliminated from their domain of concern
except business, material gains and efficient organization, unions
lost their ability to describe and critique the industrial economic
environment which fostered them. The interest of skilled labor
was separated from that of the "public interest." But, as orga-
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nized labor maintained their exclusionary position, mass pro-
duction industry came to rely more on unskilled immigrant
labor.
Ironically, mechanization, particularly in large-scale mass
production industries, reduced the attraction of the craft union
(Dubofsky, 1975). The "unskilled" now dominated the techno-
logically advanced sectors of the economy (auto, steel, meat-
packing, rubber, electrical goods). By 1919, it was the
unorganized rank and file, the immigrant, the unskilled workers
who remained the most significant threat to industrial hege-
mony, not the unions. Strikes increased but not trade union
membership (Brecher, 1972). In fact, the AFL, in a desperate
attempt after World War I to save itself from extinction, entered
an agreement with industry and government alike which went
beyond mere cooperation. Their antistrike, procontract position
was traded for the right to organize and they became facilitators
of the new "company unions."
The Role of the State
Industry would ultimately turn to government as yet another
tool to control workers' behavior. Since welfare work and in-
dustrial organization could not completely contain strikes it be-
came necessary to create new "social consciousness" which would
be predicated on a new idea of the government as "imperial
mediator."
The U.S. government did not take on the responsibility of
categorical benefits and of social welfare as we know it today
officially until 1935 and then only as a response to strikes and
the collapse of the economy. However, the precedent for govern-
ment to assume this role was set at the turn of the century by
industry and the National Civil Federation in their effort to es-
tablish government's mediator role. Industry was actively look-
ing for ways of transferring the cost of industrial welfare work
to government. Since industry was involved in everything from
setting up cooking classes for the wives of workers to building
roads leading to and from their establishments this was an ex-
pensive and therefore necessary transfer. The cities would "in-
herit" many of the welfare measures and programs previously
conducted by industry, as is illustrated in the case of Dayton,
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Ohio. Here, the city took over the National Cash Register Com-
pany's "welfare" program, "to take care of the education and the
health and working conditions of employees and their families."
Without interfering with the internal dynamics of industry, the
social services were designed around the attitude that "happy
workers are more efficient." Dayton constructed parks, planted
trees, built new bridges. The city's welfare department inspected
milk, provided free legal aid, established a municipal employ-
ment agency, a municipal lodging house, provided free medical
examinations for school children, free vaccination, playgrounds,
play festivals, and other social services. The city also created
new employment opportunities by building its own asphalt
plant, new sewers, and instituting city-wide services. Often
these types of services and municipal ownership policies coin-
cided with the aims of radical social reforms, though their ob-
jectives remained different.
There was a conceptual change which occurred as well within
this transferal of the responsibility for social services. By the
1920s the old philosophy of laissez-faire had been completely
replaced by a new Republican ideology and organizational di-
rection which enlarged government and its functions. The in-
volvement of the federal government as a "neutral third party"
standing between owners and workers was designed to curb
organized confrontation. Government "presence" it was hoped,
would create an aura of fairness in negotiated settlements, rather
than changing workers' independent action. This new role of
the State is central to understanding other changes at the time.
By the 1890s it had become apparent that society could no
longer allow workers to shift for themselves in an imaginary free
market place, or be subject to the whims of their employers, or
even worse, themselves. Working-class life had to be regularized
and routinized. This was the necessary consequence of bureau-
cratic-technological society as Wiebe stresses in The Search for
Order. Gigantic modem industrial corporations governed by im-
personal, formal managerial bureaucracies replaced the old set
of social relations typical of "island communities." All of the
social reformers agreed that the regularization of working class
life was a necessity, and formalized work rules became a motif
of working class existence. Unregulated working conditions and
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laissez-faire was now seen by industrialists as creating a situ-
ation which was totally unpredictable. In this context govern-
ment was seen by reformers and industrialists alike as a
regulatory alternative.
After 1916, with U.S. involvement in the war and the unions'
surrender of the right to strike, one might conclude that the state
had triumphed in the interest of capital and, in the process, had
gained a secure position for itself as mediator to maintain this
tenuous balance between unequal partners. More important,
however, the State had become the unwilling "sponsor" of col-
lective bargaining. With all of its administrative innovations to
limit participation, it was now forced to amend exclusionary
practices or continually expand the idea of the "public interest."
At the same time, however, the State would give legitimacy to
industrial autocracy when worker and citizen participation were
denied. The State could participate in the process of the repro-
duction of productive relations only by sponsoring new and
sometimes contradictory social relations. Theirs was a creative
function which helps to point out the reoccurrence of contradic-
tions in capitalism. As with the efficiency engineers, the State
began to embrace diametrically opposed ideas simultaneously:
of consent and manipulation, of men as individuals and as ma-
chines, of survival of the fittest and the social explanation of
poverty, workers as individuals and as the "group" object of
policy, of "merit" as the basis of success and the "inherent" su-
periority of business, access to information and limited
communication.
Conclusion
Work and attitudes about work are cornerstones of American
society. Unlike other countries around the world where members
of the population may share a common language, customs, or
history, the U.S. had to create a commonality for its population.
A culture of work was enforced, that is, methods of work, pat-
terns of authority, work behavior and motivation were created
from a system of rules and organization. A work ethic was
forged at the expense of ethnic cultures and values. Immigrants
were forced to give up past values and beliefs to accommodate
themselves to the new workplace. Ultimately fear of destitution
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was the driving force in the destruction of old cultural values
and the embrace of the new work ethic. The breakup of ethni-
cally specific behavior was part of what industrialists considered
necessary disciplining of the work force. This discipline was
accomplished by a process of social engineering throughout the
society. Industrialists, aided by the emerging class of social sci-
entists relied on reorganization (in government and industry)
and social services through industrial welfare programs to ac-
complish their goals. The specific objective was to create new
structures of authority, hierarchy and decision making while
cultivating new attitudes to serve as the basis of legitimacy for
these structures. All of the action and procedures used by in-
dustry to create a stock of stable, dependent wage earners served
dual functions: production and control. Industrial organization/
scientific management and industrial welfare head the list of
mechanisms for control and the transmission of the new "work
ethic."
Like industrial organization, industrial welfare had a cul-
tural as well as an ideological function. It was not enough for
workers to be controlled on the job, the work force had to be
self-regulating. Workers had to supply their own regular work
habits and timing and their own motivation for work and wages.
As we witness the current debate surrounding new indus-
trial policies toward workers similar concerns emerge. Industri-
alists and policy makers continue to address the need for
"disciplining" the remaining work force. This has come in the
form of massive lay offs, the erosion of collective bargaining and
unionization, and wage and benefit "givebacks." We are warned
that expectations must be "lowered" in the U.S. less the society
crumble under the pressures asserted by the "internal dynamics
of democracy in a high educated, mobilized and participant
society" (Sklar, 1980, p. 3). The widespread hardship which has
resulted from the attack on the working class is the result of an
effort to "discipline" and lower expectations. This review of the
process of control as it asserted itself at the turn of the century
was intended to develop a dearer perspective of the regular de-
mands of capitalism.
As we continue to be bombarded by the demands of indus-
try, the question of government's function will resurface. Citi-
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zens will have to address the logic of the corporate State in terms
of their own self-interest. On the one hand government has cul-
tivated a client relationship with workers by denying them in-
dependent action as a group. By introducing social services the
State has created structures which affect daily life. These struc-
tures can be manipulated to shape attitudes.
Ironically, the Reagan Administration's cuts in social services
and the simultaneous attack on workers and unions may be the
source of a new unity. Sectors of the population who had pre-
viously been trained to see each other as antagonists now find
they share the same plight: free food lines, welfare offices, de-
pendency. If a working unity emerges we may see a new under-
standing emerge which addresses the rights of all citizens to a
decent quality of life as an inalienable right. Working people
may see a new function for the State and the Constitution, forc-
ing us to go beyond the Lockean idea of government's function
as securing a "free market of competition."
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